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ABSTRACT 
The late twentieth century and early twenty-first century bore 
witness to a flurry of small-scale conflicts, many of which were initiated 
by the President of the United States without a formal declaration of 
war from Congress. A host of legal scholars have decried these 
hostilities and harshly admonished presidential initiative in war-
making. However, this state of affairs is not a modern phenomenon, but 
rather a fate entirely anticipated by the Framers of the US Constitution. 
By exploring a plethora of historical authorities and framing-era 
sources, this Note distills an original understanding of the President’s 
defensive war powers: the executive’s limited prerogative to 
unilaterally repel an imminent foreign threat. 
Before delving into the Framers’ understanding of constitutional 
war powers, the plain language of the Constitution is scrutinized to 
discern the basic division of war powers amongst Congress and the 
President. Next, this Note examines the failures of the Articles of 
Confederation, which forced the Framers to acknowledge the hazards 
posed by a weak government unable to protect its national interests. 
An investigation of debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
reveals the Framers’ solution to these earlier shortcomings: 
constraining the reach of Congress’ war powers so the President would 
be free to swiftly rebuff imminent foreign aggression. This original 
understanding is further clarified by the Federalist Papers, which not 
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only endorse presidential initiative in national defense but also 
acknowledge Congress’ substantial power to temper extended 
presidential war-making. After the Constitution was ratified, an 
informal war with France led the newly-minted Supreme Court to 
refine both the application of the President’s inherent defensive powers 
and Congress’ role in sanctioning limited hostilities. 
Finally, a comparative analysis with the eighteenth-century 
British Constitution and the military authority of the British Crown—a 
weighty foreign influence on the Framers—is employed to further 
define the edges of the President’s original war powers. This 
comparison highlights both the necessary strength of the President’s 
defensive war powers while also acknowledging that such authority is 
hardly a license for plenary military power or the royal prerogative for 
war-making enjoyed by the eighteenth-century British Crown. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In summarizing the Constitution’s war powers, Justice 
Frankfurter once remarked: “The war power is the war power.”1 Four 
years after this fine explanation, Justice Jackson apparently remained 
perplexed over the President’s war powers, which he described as 
“cryptic words” that have led to “some of the most persistent 
controversies in our constitutional history.”2 Over the course of the 
Constitution’s nearly 230-year long history, Congress has formally 
declared war only five times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American 
War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II.3 
However, a 1966 report from the US State Department estimated that 
the United States had deployed military forces into foreign hostilities 
at least 125 times.4 A modern evaluation from the Congressional 
Research Service strikingly concluded that military forces have been 
committed abroad over 200 times since our nation’s founding.5 
Many of these informal hostilities were small–scale conflicts 
undertaken by the President to protect American citizens or property.6 
The President’s defensive power—the ability to unilaterally commit 
military forces to rebuff foreign aggression—has become especially 
pronounced with the establishment of a large standing army in the 
twentieth century.7 Indeed, the last seventy years have seen a torrent of 
undeclared wars, many of which were initiated by the President without 
congressional approval and certainly without a formal proclamation of 
 
1. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948). 
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
3. See Official Declarations of War by Congress, U. S. SENATE https://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8QZ8-7U73] (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). Of the eleven total declarations, six 
pertain to World War II, and two pertain to World War I. See id. 
4. See Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of 
Viet-nam, 54 DEP’T STATE BULL. 474, 484 (1966). 
5. See generally BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, 
INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD (2017). 
6. See W. Taylor Reveley III, Presidential War-Making:  Constitutional Prerogative or 
Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1257-58 (1969); Meeker supra note 4; see also TORREON, 
supra note 5. 
7. See Brendan Flynn, The War Powers Consultation Act:  Keeping War out of the Zone 
of Twilight, 64 CATH. U.L. REV. 1007, 1023-34 (2015); Patrick D. Robbins, The War Powers 
Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 160-76 (1988) 
(surveying presidential war-making and non-compliance with congressional regulation in the 
late-twentieth century). 
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war.8 Some critics have argued that the President’s defensive power is 
a tragic invention of the modern era, egged on by a degrading 
adherence to the separation of powers.9 
However, the President’s defensive power is neither a twentieth-
century development nor the spawn of a floundering constitutional 
system. As evidenced by a plethora of framing-era authorities, the 
original understanding of the President’s war powers included the 
limited authority to suppress an imminent foreign threat.10 The 
Constitution was designed to encourage presidential initiative in the 
immediate defense of national borders while necessitating 
congressional approval to sustain longer conflicts.11 In cultivating this 
original understanding of the Constitution’s war powers, this Note 
addresses three critical pieces of history: (1) the flimsy Articles of 
Confederation, (2) the debate over war powers at the Constitutional 
Convention, and (3) the understanding and application of war powers 
in the post-drafting era. To further reveal the contours of the President’s 
original defensive war powers, a pervasive foreign influence is 
introduced and compared—the eighteenth-century British Constitution 
and the military authority of the British Crown. This comparison 
illuminates the scope of the President’s defensive war powers and 
showcases the capacious influence the British Crown had on the 
Framers. 
Part II inspects the plain language of the Constitution to sketch 
the basic war powers framework. Part III advances an original 
understanding of the President’s defensive war powers by consulting a 
variety of framing-era sources. Specifically, Part III.A examines the 
severe military deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and Part 
III.B investigates how the Framers resolved these inadequacies at the 
Constitutional Convention and originally conceived of the President’s 
defensive power. Part III.C explores the endorsement of this inherent 
 
8. See Robbins, supra note 7, at 162-76; see also John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics 
by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 177-82 
(1996). See Mark T. Uyeda, Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy U.S. 
Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 781, 803-05 (1995); see also 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A “Joint Decision” Solution, 
77 GEO. L.J. 367, 374-85 (1988). 
9. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991); see also 
generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990). 
10. See infra Parts II and III.   
11. See infra Parts II and III. 
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executive authority in the Federalist Papers and subsequent refinement 
in early Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Part IV introduces the eighteenth-century British Crown’s war 
powers as both a considerable influence on the Framers and a 
comparative tool to contextualize the original understanding of the 
President’s defensive war powers. Part IV.A details the British 
Constitution’s historic division of war powers and Part IV.B analyzes 
the scope of the President’s original defensive war powers alongside 
the eighteenth-century military authority of the British Crown. 
II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Deciphering the “cryptic words”12 that give rise to the President’s 
defensive war powers requires delving into their foundation: the basic 
text and structure of the Constitution. Articles I and II of the 
Constitution largely divide war powers amongst Congress and the 
President, while Article III circumscribes a more limited role for the 
federal judiciary.13 Article I provides Congress with a number of 
explicitly enumerated war powers, such as the authority to “declare 
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning 
captures on land and water.”14 Congress is also singularly empowered 
to lay taxes to provide for the defense of the United States.15 The list of 
congressional war powers does not stop there. In addition to regulating 
local militias16 and significant aspects of foreign affairs,17 Congress is 
also vested with the coveted “purse” power: the authority to raise and 
support military forces via monetary appropriations.18 The purse power 
 
12. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
13. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-III. However, the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction can 
certainly extend to controversies which implicate foreign affairs. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 211 (1962) (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). But see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 
589 (1952) (“[P]olicies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political 
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
15. See id. § 8, cl. 1. 
16. See id. § 8, cl. 15-16. See also infra note 29 and accompanying text for further 
discussion. 
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 33 (regulating international commerce), cl. 4 
(establishing immigration rules), cl. 10 (punishing piracy and maritime felonies). 
18. Id. § 8, cl. 12-13. 
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is an indispensable element of war—financial support is the lifeblood 
of extended military affairs.19 
At first blush, the President’s Article II war powers may seem 
somewhat meager in comparison to Congress’ formidable 
enumerations. Although Article II unambiguously defines the President 
as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States,”20 the executive’s remaining war powers are more nebulous. 
The Constitution vests the President with the murky “executive 
Power”21 and the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”22 Finally, upon assuming office, the President is 
constitutionally required to take an oath of office that instills a mandate 
to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.”23 
The President’s role as national Commander in Chief, perhaps the 
most famous of these enumerations, is an unqualified grant of 
authority.24 Although some provisions of the Constitution distinguish 
between a “time of peace”25 and a “time of war[,]”26 the Commander 
in Chief clause is not among them.27 The President is always the United 
States’ Commander in Chief, regardless of whether it is a time of 
tranquility or battle.28 Although the Constitution limits executive 
control over state militias,29 there are no temporal restrictions on the 
President’s authority over the national military.30 The Commander in 
 
19. See infra notes 101-106 (describing the Framers’ appreciation of the incredible control 
commanded by Congress’ purse power). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
21. Id. § 1, cl. 1. 
22. Id. § 3. 
23. Id. § 1, cl. 8. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30. 
25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from engaging in various 
wartime measures during times of peace, provided there is no threat of imminent danger or 
invasion). 
26. See, e.g., id. amends. III (quartering soldiers), V (grand jury indictment); see also id. 
art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended during times of 
conflict). 
27. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
28. See supra notes 25-27. 
29. The President is only Commander in Chief of state militias when such forces are called 
into service of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Only Congress can call forth 
local militias. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
30. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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Chief clause ensures that the nation’s armed forces continually serve 
under the President’s direction.31 
The “executive Power” clause is similarly exclusive—the entirety 
of executive power is vested in the President, thereby creating a de jure 
Chief Executive.32 This executive power suffers few limits: it is 
generally enumerated but not defined in its entirety.33 Nothing 
explicitly outlines or confines the President’s executive power.34 In 
contrast, Article I limits congressional authority to the “legislative 
Powers herein granted.”35 The inclusion of “herein” indicates that 
Congress’ war powers are limited to the Constitution’s explicit 
enumerations.36 Although the President’s executive power is not 
similarly confined by the constitutional text, it necessarily excludes 
Congress’ explicitly enumerated war powers to effectuate the 
separation of powers.37 The President’s oath to protect and defend the 
Constitution, as well as the responsibility to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed, further inform the bounds of the executive power.38 
The Constitution does not prescribe these weighty duties on any other 
organ of the federal government, implicating their importance as 
matters of presidential discretion.39 It follows that, as Chief Executive, 
the President is uniquely empowered to enact policies outside 
Congress’ purview which serve to protect and defend the Constitution 
and ensure the laws are faithfully executed.40 As discussed below in 
Part III, the Framers understood that the gravitas of the President’s 
exclusive duties as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief would 
 
31. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668 
(1862) (“The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power.”). 
33. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138 (1926) (“The difficulty of a complete 
enumeration of all the cases of executive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general 
terms. . . .”). 
34. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
36. See, e.g., supra notes 14-17; see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 138-39. 
37. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The powers of the 
President are not as particularized as are those of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not 
mean undefined powers. The separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential 
content to undefined provisions in the frame of our government.”); Springer v. Government of 
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928). 
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. § 3; see Myers, 272 U.S. at 138. 
39. See supra notes 37-38. 
40. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
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become infinitely weightier when the United States is confronted with 
an imminent foreign attack.41 
III.  DISTILLING THE PRESIDENT’S DEFENSIVE POWER 
Gleaning the original understanding of the Chief Executive’s 
defensive power demands exploration of more than just the 
Constitution’s text. Crucial moments in constitutional history must also 
be examined: namely, the Articles of Confederation that governed 
during and after the Revolutionary War, the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787, and influential authorities from the post-drafting period. Part 
III.A details the military deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation 
and Part III.B inspects the Framers’ response to such failings when 
drafting the Constitution in 1787. Finally, Part III.C analyzes two 
preeminent sources of original understanding from the post-drafting 
period: the Federalist Papers and early Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
A. The Follies of the Articles of Confederation 
The Articles of Confederation were ratified in 1781 and governed 
the United States for seven years before the Constitution became the 
“law of the land.”42 The Articles vested all federal power—legislative, 
executive, and judicial—in a national assembly, the Continental 
Congress.43 The Continental Congress had “the sole and exclusive right 
and power of determining on peace and war.”44 This grant included the 
singular authority to raise and support armed forces, make requisitions 
from states to support the war effort, and enter into treaties or 
alliances.45 Many of these war powers required the assent of at least 
nine states before they could be effectuated.46 Individually, the states 
 
41. See infra Part III. 
42. OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/articles [https://perma.cc/73UV-H8UR] (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
43. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
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were mostly barred from engaging in war absent congressional 
consent.47 
The gross failures of this system informed the Framers’ intent and 
goals when eventually crafting the Chief Executive’s war powers in the 
Constitution.48 Alexander Hamilton noted several “material defects”49 
pertaining to war powers under the Articles, namely, the inability to 
reclaim territories held by foreign powers, lack of adequate military 
funding, and powerlessness to swiftly repel foreign aggression.50 
Hamilton asserted that the inability to coerce financial support in times 
of public crisis was nothing short of a fatal flaw.51 The Articles were 
deemed “neither fit for war, nor peace.”52 Hamilton’s avowals evidence 
a desire for a fast-moving national government capable of rapidly 
subordinating states when necessary to end a public crisis or rebuff 
foreign invasion.53 
Hamilton’s vocal criticisms were supported by a chorus of fellow 
Framers similarly frustrated with the lack of national security under the 
Articles.54 James Madison joined Hamilton in observing that “[t]he 
small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time 
of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local 
prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate 
 
47. See id. art. VI (prohibiting state war-making absent congressional authorization unless 
the state was invaded or under threat of imminent attack). States could not maintain a navy or 
standing army during peacetime without congressional consent. See id. 
48. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text. 
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 15-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). A 
significant portion of the Federalist Papers—discussed infra Part III.C.1—are explicitly 
dedicated to addressing the many “insufficiencies” and “defects” of the Articles. See generally 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15-17, 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 18-20 (Alexander Hamilton 
and James Madison). Part III.A identifies the critiques most distinctly related to the Articles’ 
war powers. 
50.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 16 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
(“[Under the Articles of Confederation,] [w]e have neither troops, nor treasury, nor 
government.”). Hamilton explicitly referenced Spain’s exclusion of U.S. passage on the 
Mississippi River as one such incident that caused the United States to nearly reach “the last 
stage of national humiliation.” Id. 
51. See id. (“[T]he evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial 
imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be 
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.”). 
52. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-0838 [https://perma.cc/26J9-2Z5E].  
53. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
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contributions to the treasury.”55 Edmund Randolph asserted that the 
Articles “produced no security against foreign invasion; [the 
Continental Congress] not being permitted to prevent a war nor to 
support it by their own authority.”56 Foreign aggression was an 
insurmountably weighty burden under the Articles.57 
Many Framers recognized that a national legislature, by design, 
was poorly equipped to handle threats to national security.58 John Jay 
argued that the central government needed a separate branch to engage 
in “the executive business of sovereignty” for matters outside the reach 
of a large national assembly,59 which Jay viewed as inherently prone to 
division and susceptible to foreign influence.60 Robert Morris lamented 
that he would be “[h]appy to experience a momentary relief from the 
clamor and revolt of a starving army[] [and] from the rage and 
devastation of an inveterate enemy. . . .”61 Morris aptly characterized 
the Continental Congress as “cumbrous” and “unwieldy”—for him, 
like many others, the national legislature was incapable of speedily 
delivering the necessary support “on which the salvation of country 
depends.”62 The Framers’ grievances about the Articles’ war powers 
crystallized their intent when crafting the Constitution’s war powers: 
they wanted a well-equipped, non-legislative branch of national 
government that could swiftly repel foreign aggression and remain 
unencumbered by both national and state actors.63 
B. Executive Power Reborn: The Constitutional Convention 
The Constitutional Convention provided an opportunity for the 
Framers to correct the vast shortcomings of the Articles.64 Throughout 
 
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 19, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
56. RICHARD J. ELLIS, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 161 (1999). 
57. See sources cited supra notes 48-56. 
58. See sources cited infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
59. See Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Jan. 7, 1787), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0427 [https://perma.cc/24FA-HCUP]. 
60. See id. 
61. ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS, PATRIOT AND FINANCIER 125 
(2012). 
62. Id. 
63. See notes supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
64. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter Farrand] (“[T]he articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & 
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely ‘common defence 
[sic], security of liberty and general welfare.’”). This statement was made by Edmund Randolph 
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the summer of 1787, delegates converged on Philadelphia with a wealth 
of proposals concerning executive authority.65 Despite hearing from a 
number of sophisticated political minds—including Edmund 
Randolph, James Wilson, William Paterson, and Hamilton—none of 
these early proposals were adopted in their original form.66 Promising 
segments were sent to the Committee of Detail, a small group of 
delegates charged with merging various proposals into a workable 
constitutional draft.67 
The Committee of Detail’s early draft of the Constitution 
provided Congress with the power to “make war.”68 In subsequent floor 
debate, Pierce Butler suggested that the power to “make war” should 
be vested in the President, as political accountability could temper 
executive discretion and thereby prevent egregious war-making.69 
After Butler’s response, Madison and Elbridge Gerry immediately 
moved “to insert ‘declare,’ striking out ‘make’ war; leaving to the 
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”70 Rufus King supported 
this change, noting that “‘make’ war might be understood to ‘conduct’ 
it which was an Executive function.”71 The Madison-Gerry amendment 
eventually prevailed in an 8-1 vote: Congress would only have the 
power to “declare” war, not to “make” war.72 
This debate and subsequent amendment constitute the foundation 
of the President’s defensive war powers: the Chief Executive’s military 
 
but expressed a sentiment widely shared amongst the Framers. See, e.g., Letter from John Jay to 
George Washington (Mar. 16, 1787), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-
03-02-0525 [https://perma.cc/TC9T-65BR] (“[A]n opinion begins to prevail that a general 
convention for revising the articles of Confederation would be expedient.”); see also discussion 
supra notes 49-63. 
65. See, e.g., Farrand, supra note 64, at 20-23 (the “Virginia Plan”), 242-45 (the “New 
Jersey Plan”), 291-92 (Hamilton’s proposal). 
66. Randolph’s “Virginia Plan” envisioned a “National Executive” with the executive 
rights previously enjoyed by the Continental Congress under the Articles. See id. at 226-27. 
Paterson’s “New Jersey Plan” provided for a weak executive that would be elected and 
controlled by Congress. See id. at 244. Finally, Hamilton championed an executive “governor” 
who would possess many of the same war powers enjoyed by modern-day presidents. See id. at 
291-92. 
67. See id. at 127-28, 131-32. 
68. See id. at 318-19. 
69. See id. at 318. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 319. 
72. Id. at 315. See also Yoo, supra note 8, at 264 (clarifying contradicting reports of 
whether the Madison-Gerry amendment initially passed and concluding that, per Madison’s 
notes, it initially passed by a vote of 7-2, and again by a vote of 8-1 after King’s argument). 
164 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
authority now encompassed “the power to repel sudden attacks” and to 
directly oversee the resulting hostilities.73 By explicitly carving this 
power out from the auspices of Congress,74 the Framers created a 
limited realm of inherent executive authority which could not be 
trespassed upon by the national legislature.75 In doing so, the Framers 
addressed major deficiencies under the Articles: no longer would a 
cumbersome legislature be convened when a quick response was 
needed; a solitary executive would swiftly act to repel an imminent 
attack and protect national interests.76 The limits of the President’s 
defensive war powers were staked out: the Chief Executive could not 
single-handedly usher the United States into full-blown war but could 
engage the nation in more limited hostilities.77 
C. The Post-Drafting Years 
The Framers’ support for the President’s defensive war powers 
did not end with the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in 
September 1787.78 From October 1787 until August 1788, Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay anonymously published a collection of eighty-five 
essays entitled the Federalist Papers.79 These essays urged states to 
ratify the new Constitution as the “safest course” to secure liberty, 
dignity, and happiness for the new nation.80 Today, these papers proffer 
vital original interpretations of the Constitution from some of the most 
prolific and influential Framers.81 After the Constitution was ultimately 
ratified, early Supreme Court jurisprudence critically developed the 
war powers enumerated in the Constitution and refined the President’s 
 
73. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
74. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
76. See supra Part III.A and notes 68-72. 
77. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, Madison’s notes do not 
clarify what type of “sudden attack” he thought would trigger the President’s defensive powers. 
78. See discussion infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text. 
79. See The Federalist Papers, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://crf-usa.org/foundations-of-
our-constitution/the-federalist-papers.html [https://perma.cc/5F8T-9ZZD] (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018). 
80. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
Hamilton eloquently noted that “in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making 
proselytes by fire and sword.” Id. at 8. 
81. Primary Documents in History, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/
bib/ourdocs/federalist.html#American [https://perma.cc/KH35-GMWD] (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018). 
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inherent defensive powers. Part III.C.1 details the Federalist Papers’ 
endorsements of the Chief Executive’s unilateral military authority and 
its relation to Congress’ war powers. Part III.C.2 analyzes the Court’s 
early interpretations of the President’s inherent defensive power and 
Congress’ authority to sanction informal hostilities. 
1. Convincing a Wary Nation: The Federalist Papers 
The state debates over ratification bitterly divided the public—
many feared that their state’s rights would be swallowed up by the new 
federal government, thereby reinstating a new cycle of tyranny.82 In 
persuading the skeptic public of the new Constitution’s merits and 
assuaging fears of federal oppression, the Federalist Papers provided 
invaluable articulations of presidential military authority and the 
separation of war powers amongst Congress and the executive.83 One 
of the foremost concerns underlying the Federalist Papers was 
demonstrating the proposed government’s ability to protect the United 
States.84 In Federalist No. 41, Madison defined national security as “an 
avowed and essential object of the American Union.”85 But how best 
to secure one of the most “primitive objects of civil society”?86  
Hamilton provided a fitting response in Federalist No. 74: 
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war 
most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the 
exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies 
the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing 
and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential 
part in the definition of the executive authority.87 
 
82. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to General Washington (Oct. 30, 1787), 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-from-gov-morris-to-george-
washington/ [https://perma.cc/WXC2-HF58] (“I dread the cold and sour temper of the back 
counties, and still more the wicked industry of those who have long habituated themselves to 
live on the public, and cannot bear the idea of being removed from the power and profit of state 
government. . . .”); see also Brutus, Essay X, (Jan. 24, 1788), http://teachingamerican
history.org/library/document/brutus-x/ [https://perma.cc/GDE9-RZGS] (arguing that states 
should have exclusive control over local militias to offset the inherent danger of military 
despotism posed by a large national standing army). 
83. See discussion infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. 
84. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 207-08 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
85. Id. at 206-07. 
86. Id. at 206. 
87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
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Presidential initiative was deemed necessary to shield the United 
States from foreign attack.88  Moreover, Hamilton identified the 
President’s executive authority (or, as vested by Article II of the 
Constitution, “executive Power”89) as encompassing not only the 
direction of military force, but also discretion in employing such 
forces.90 Hamilton hints that, as the lone Chief Executive, the President 
should have the power to deploy military forces as deemed necessary 
to further the “direction of war.”91  Federalist No. 71 similarly endorsed 
executive discretion: “it is certainly desirable that the Executive should 
be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and 
decision.”92 In fact, robust presidential initiative was deemed “essential 
to the protection of the community against foreign attacks” in 
Federalist No. 70.93 As recognized in Federalist No. 25, these foreign 
threats could arise even absent a formal declaration of war.94  For some 
of the most prominent Framers, the President, as Chief Executive and 
Commander in Chief, was constitutionally empowered to deploy and 
control military forces to repel a foreign attack, irrespective of whether 
there was a formal state of hostilities.95  Presidential discretion was a 
felt necessity during times of war.96 The Federalist Papers’ support of 
unilateral executive military authority shined a much-needed light upon 
the cloudy waters of the President’s constitutional war powers.97 
 
88. See id. (“The propriety of [the Article II Commander in Chief clause] . . . is so evident 
in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in 
general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.”). 
89. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
90. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
91. See id. 
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  See 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“That unity 
is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch [sic] will 
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the 
proceedings of any greater number . . . .”). 
93.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . [and] to the security of 
liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”). 
94. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 126 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(“[T]he ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse . . . .”). 
95. See discussion supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
96. See discussion supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
97. See discussion supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
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Many antifederalists were troubled by the President’s proposed 
control over the military and feared that such authority would enable 
despotism.98 In response, the Federalist Papers emphasized that the 
separation of vital war powers amongst Congress and the President 
would prevent federal tyranny.99 While describing this divided 
authority in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton contended that the President 
“holds the sword of the community” while Congress “commands the 
purse.”100 In Federalist No. 58, Madison unabashedly defined 
Congress’ purse power as a “powerful instrument” that is the “most 
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people.”101 Without Congress’ 
financial support, the executive’s extended military efforts are 
hamstrung.102 Sustained military engagements are impossible to 
maintain absent congressional appropriations and taxes.103 Thus, 
congressional control over military funding, and the associated power 
to raise and regulate wartime forces,104 serve as the ultimate check on 
executive war-making.105 After all, as proclaimed in Federalist No. 51, 
the legislature is the predominate branch of the federal government—
not the executive.106 
Madison also acknowledged in Federalist No. 51 that no arm of 
the federal government could exist without some form of check on its 
power.107 Federalist No. 69 asserted that, in addition to the purse 
power, Congress’ exclusive license to call upon state militias acted as 
 
98. See, e.g., Philadelphiensis, Essay IX, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER (Feb. 6, 1788), 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/philadelphiensis-ix/ [https://perma.cc/
XLJ9-TUE2] (“Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, 
and one of the most dangerous kind too; a king elected to command a standing army? Thus our 
laws are to be administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of 
the executive department is put in his hands.”). See also An Old Whig, Essay V, PHILA. INDEP. 
GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/an-old-whig-v/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PXZ-8YPV].  
99.   See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying discussion. 
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 298 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
102. See id. at 297 (“The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can 
propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government.”). 
103. See supra notes 15, 18-19 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra notes 100-104. 
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“In 
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”). 
107. See id. at 264-66. 
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a significant limitation on executive military action.108 However, 
control over the national military is not among the war powers divided 
between Congress and the President.109 In addition, Congress does not 
enjoy any of the President’s “executive Power,”110 which, per several 
of the Federalist Papers, could encompass the unilateral deployment of 
military forces to quickly rebuff foreign aggression.111 These essays 
also recognized that this defensive power would be most effectively 
employed by a lone Chief Executive, rather than a national 
legislature.112 Although the Federalist Papers indicated that Congress 
can utilize their control over local militias and purse power to temper 
and even terminate presidential war-making,113 they also 
acknowledged that the power and discretion to quickly repel a foreign 
attack is firmly rooted in executive prerogative.114 
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The Federalist Papers were ultimately successful in their mission: 
after a “long and arduous” journey, the Constitution became “the 
official governing document of the United States” on June 21, 1788.115 
However, the post-ratification years would not be a quiet period of 
nation-building.116 Conflicts with Native Americans and a naval war 
with France quickly followed the Constitution’s ratification.117 
Consequently, litigation concerning federal war powers and 
presidential authority wove its way into some of the Supreme Court’s 
earliest dockets.118 As the newly-minted authoritative interpreters of 
the Constitution,119 the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from the post-
 
108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 349-50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
109. See id. 
110. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 87-94. 
112. See supra notes 109-111. 
113. See supra notes 100-106. 
114. See supra notes 86-97. 
115. The day the Constitution was ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21, 2018), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified. 
116. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION 
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 91-127 (1975); see also 
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE 
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-1801, at 90-105 (1966). 
117. See sources supra note 116. 
118. See discussion infra notes 121-166 and accompanying text. 
119. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166-67 (1803). 
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ratification period crucially molded the original understanding of the 
President’s unilateral war powers.120 
Chief Justice John Marshall critically sculpted the fiber of the 
presidency in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison.121 Marshall 
recognized that the President is vested with “certain important political 
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion.”122 For 
such matters, the President is “accountable only to his country in his 
political character” and, of course, “to his own conscience.”123 While 
simultaneously recognizing the federal judiciary’s power of supreme 
review,124 Marshall also observed that some presidential actions are 
necessarily outside the purview of Article III courts.125 The Court 
found that policy determinations, which are constitutionally committed 
to the President, are ripe for political questions.126 The constitutional 
grants underlying the President’s war powers—namely, the 
“Commander in Chief” and “executive Power” clauses127—are prime 
contenders for such “important political powers”128 that are to be 
exercised solely at the President’s discretion.129 No other federal 
branch can ever assume the title of “Commander in Chief” or enjoy any 
of the President’s “executive Power.”130 As described above, formative 
Framers understood these exclusive constitutional grants as giving rise 
to the defensive power to repel imminent foreign attacks.131 Thus, 
Marshall’s holding implies that the President’s exclusive defensive 
power is a matter of executive discretion and outside the scrutiny of the 
federal judiciary—it remains answerable only to the political virtues of 
the American people and the fortitude of the executive’s conscience.132 
 
120. See discussion infra notes 121-166 and accompanying text. 
121. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. 
122. Id. at 165-66. 
123. Id. at 166. 
124. See id. at 166-67. 
125. See id. at 170. 
126. See id. (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and 
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”). Marshall provided several 
examples of political questions in Marbury: the President’s appointment and nomination 
powers, as well as the President’s power to grant commissions. Id. at 155-56, 166-67; see also 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2-3. 
127. See discussion supra notes 20-21, 26-32. 
128. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165. 
129. See id. at 155-56, 166-67. 
130. See sources supra notes 20-21, 26-32. 
131. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C.1. 
132. See discussion supra notes 121-131.  
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In the years directly preceding Marbury, a trio of cases concerning 
naval hostilities with France clarified Congress’ authority to sanction 
informal military affairs.133 First, in the 1800 case Bas v. Tingy,134 a 
dispute over salvage rights prompted the Court to consider whether a 
congressional declaration of war was necessary to formalize 
engagement in hostilities.135 Even though war was not “declared in 
form,”136 the Court found that Congress had authorized an “imperfect 
war”137 that was “limited as to places, persons, and things”138 by 
enacting a general law regulating the recapture of ships from the 
“enemy”139 and additional legislation clearly indicating that France 
was the intended “enemy” referenced in the recapture statute.140 In 
recognizing the practical effect of this antagonistic legislation, the 
Court held that “war may exist without a declaration” and that “a 
defensive war requires no declaration.”141 A year later, the Court’s 
decision in Talbot v. Seeman142 again confirmed that Congress could 
authorize a “partial” war of limited breadth against France without a 
formal declaration.143 These cases unambiguously stand for the 
proposition that a declaration of war is not required to engage in 
hostilities; Congress may authorize a war that is “imperfect” or 
“solemn,”144 the scope of military campaigns may be “general” and 
sweeping or “partial” and limited.145 A formal pronouncement is not 
required to baptize hostilities.146 
 
133. See discussion infra notes 134-155 and accompanying text. 
134. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). 
135. See id. at 40, 43. 
136. Id. at 40. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 39. 
140. Id. at 41 (“[C]ongress had raised an army; stopped all intercourse with France; 
dissolved our treaty; built and equipt [sic] ships of war; and commissioned private armed 
ships . . . to defend themselves against the armed ships of France . . . and to re-capture armed 
vessels found in their possession.”). 
141. Id. at 37. 
142. 5 U.S. 1 (1801). 
143. Id. at 28 (“[C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general 
laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as 
they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.”). The Court explicitly drew upon their 
holding in Bas v. Tingy in arriving at this conclusion. Id. at 9. 
144. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 40. 
145. See Talbot, 5 U.S. at 8. 
146. See id.; Bas, 4 U.S. at 40. 
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Finishing the trio of cases is Little v. Barreme,147 wherein the 
Court held a naval officer personally liable for following a presidential 
order that went beyond Congress’ authorization for limited sea captures 
in the unofficial war with France.148 Much like the preceding 
controversies in Bas and Tingy, Little is centered upon the legal effect 
of war once it has already commenced, not the power of actually going 
to war.149 The focal point of these cases is not inherent war powers, but 
rather legislation arising from Congress’ authority to “make Rules 
concerning Captures on . . . Water.”150 The Court’s jurisdiction is 
derived from its power to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction”151—not the President’s or Congress’ constitutional power 
to initiate hostilities. By focusing on Congress’ statute providing for 
limited captures, the Court avoided directly assessing constitutional 
war powers and sidestepped a political question.152 Moreover, even 
when holding a naval officer personally liable for following a 
presidential war order, the Court refrained from enjoining enforcement 
of the President’s original military command.153 Marshall intentionally 
left the issue of the President’s inherent war powers open: 
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose 
high duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” 
and who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of the 
United States, might not, without any special authority for that 
purpose, in the then existing state of things, have empowered the 
officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to 
seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which 
were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce.154 
 
147. 6 U.S. 170 (1804). 
148. See id. at 178-79. 
149. See id. at 176-78; Talbot, 5 U.S. at 27-29; Bas, 4 U.S. at 40-42. 
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
151. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
152. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.; Little, 6 U.S. at 177-79; see also J. 
Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 483 (2005) 
(“Bas was a case of statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation.”); Yoo, supra note 
8, at 294 (“Rather than making grand pronouncements on the separation of powers, cases such 
as Bas, Talbot, and Little underscored Congress’ role in deciding on the legal state of relations 
with a hostile nation.”); sources supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text. Professor Yoo 
aptly noted that “[n]either Bas, Talbot, nor Little (nor all three added together) constituted the 
Marbury of foreign relations law.” Yoo, supra note 8, at 294. 
153. See Little, 6 U.S. at 179. 
154. Id. at 177. 
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The President’s inherent war powers, and the executive’s authority to 
venture beyond congressional authorization, remain untouched by 
Little.155 
Judicial recognition of the President’s defensive war powers came 
at the twilight of the framing era. The 1827 case Martin v. Mott156 arose 
from a militiaman’s refusal to answer a President’s call to service after 
the militiaman deemed the emergency insufficient to justify the use of 
the militia.157 In an unanimous decision, the Court held that, under the 
Militia Act of 1795 (“Militia Act”), the President is “the judge of the 
existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act 
according to his belief of the facts.”158 As such, the Court held that the 
President was vested with the exclusive authority to declare an 
emergency.159 The determination of a state of emergency was 
necessarily conclusive upon all subordinate officers160 and mandated 
an appropriate military response to suppress the imminent threat.161 
However, the Court found that this authority to rebuff foreign 
aggression did not derive solely from the Militia Act, but also from the 
“nature of the power itself”162: 
If we look at the language of . . . [the Militia Act], every conclusion 
drawn from the nature of the power itself, is strongly fortified. The 
words are, “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in 
imminent danger of invasion, &c. [sic] it shall be lawful for the 
President, &c [sic] to call forth such number of the militia, &c [sic] 
as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion.” The power itself 
is confided to the Executive of the Union, to him who is, by the 
constitution, “the commander in chief of the militia, when called 
into the actual service of the United States,” whose duty it is to 
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and whose 
 
155. See id. at 177-79. 
156. 25 U.S. 19 (1827). 
157. See id. at 28. 
158. Id. at 31. 
159  See id. 
160. Id. at 31-32. 
161. See id. 
162. Id. at 30 (“We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency 
has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other 
persons. We think that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself, 
and from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Congress.”). 
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responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations is 
secured by the highest sanctions.163 
Notwithstanding the Militia Act, the Court suggests that the 
President’s constitutional roles as Chief Executive and Commander in 
Chief provide independent authority to repel foreign attacks.164 The 
inherent defensive power could only be exercised in true exigencies: 
“upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under 
circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union.”165 
The close of the framing era brought with it an implicit recognition of 
the President’s limited constitutional authority to repel foreign 
invasions and the narrow circumstances that justify the exercise of such 
power.166 
The failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide for even 
basic national protection offered a cautionary tale of the dangers posed 
by a feeble federal government.167 The Framers heeded these warnings 
when drafting the Constitution and explicitly created a Commander in 
Chief who could unilaterally repel foreign aggression,168 yet remained 
sufficiently tethered to congressional purse strings to prevent hostilities 
outside the interests of the people.169 Leading Framers advocated for 
an “energetic”170 Chief Executive empowered to rebuff sudden 
attacks171 while soothing fears that the Constitution would enable 
federal tyranny.172 Finally, the Supreme Court recognized the 
boundaries of the President’s defensive power: even in an era of 
“imperfect” wars and “partial” conflicts,173 only “sudden emergencies” 
and “great occasions of state” triggered the executive’s inherent 
 
163. Id. at 31. Michael Bahar, former Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security 
Council, pinpointed the same language in Martin to similarly conclude that the President 
possesses inherent constitutional authority to repel foreign attacks. See Michael Bahar, The 
Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the 
Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 553-54 (2014). 
164. See Martin, 25 U.S. at 31. 
165. Id. at 30. 
166. See discussion supra notes 156-165. 
167. See supra notes 50, 54-62 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 17-19, 99-105 and accompanying text. 
170. See sources supra notes 92-93. 
171. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 134-146 and accompanying text. 
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defensive power.174 Even if likely outside the judiciary’s purview, the 
presidential defensive power would be held accountable by the scrutiny 
of the American people, further tempering the Chief Executive’s 
discretion.175 Constitutionally charged with a robust mandate to protect 
national borders, the institution of the President was designed to 
speedily rebuff foreign aggression, with a wary Congress guiding the 
tiller for the journey ahead. 
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 
The Framers did not create the Constitution in a vacuum—as 
former English colonists, the British Constitution loomed over nearly 
every aspect of their pre-revolution lives.176 Even when the Framers 
shed the shackles of British rule, they did not abandon the treasure trove 
of political knowledge embedded in the British Constitution.177 
Familiar terms such as “Commander in Chief,” “executive Power,” and 
“declare War” were sown from the bedrock of the British 
Constitution.178 As such, the original understanding of the President’s 
defensive war powers can be further illuminated by comparing its 
contours with the contemporaneous military authority of the British 
Commander in Chief—the royal Crown.179 Part IV.A describes the 
division of war powers in the eighteenth-century British Constitution 
and Part IV.B juxtaposes royal war powers with the President’s 
defensive military authority. 
A. The British Crown’s Royal Prerogative 
While the American executive’s war powers are founded in a 
written constitution, the British Crown’s military authority stems from 
 
174. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827). 
175. See supra notes 121-131 and accompanying text. 
176. See M.E. Bradford, The Best Constitution in Existence: The Influence of the British 
Example on the Framers of Our Fundamental Law, 27 BYU STUD. Q. 51, 58-64 (1987); see 
generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967) (masterfully detailing the colonists’ intellectual determinism to reclaim crucial liberties 
from their British overseers). 
177. See Bradford, supra note 176, at 63 (“If there is one constant in the political discourse 
of eighteenth-century Americans it, is a generous and undeviating admiration for the British 
constitution as they knew it.”). 
178. See discussion infra notes 186-193. 
179. See infra Part IV.B for this comparative analysis. 
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the unwritten principles of the British Constitution.180 The British 
Constitution is not a single document, but rather an abstract set of 
practices, common law jurisprudence, and conventions that evolve over 
time.181 In a similar vein to the American Constitution, the eighteenth-
century British Constitution apportioned military powers between 
Parliament and the Crown.182 Britain survived near-continuous warfare 
from the mid-seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth 
century,183 which heavily influenced and dictated the division of war 
powers between the Crown and Parliament.184 
Renowned jurist William Blackstone masterfully articulated the 
division of war powers within the eighteenth-century British 
Constitution in his seminal Commentaries on the Laws of England.185 
Blackstone powerfully described the Crown as a “generalissimo” that 
supremely reigned over all British military forces.186 The British 
generalissimo’s royal prerogative included the exclusive authority to 
raise, regulate, and command all manner of military forces—armies, 
fleets, forts, and any “places of strength.”187 All military installations 
were subject to the Crown’s approval.188 The Crown’s mighty domestic 
power was even more pronounced abroad: the Crown was a binding 
and necessary element for all foreign matters.189 This sweeping 
 
180. See Robert Blackburn, Britain’s Unwritten Constitution, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution [https://perma.cc/8G9E-
DXDG]; see also Yoo, supra note 8, at 198. 
181. See  Blackburn, supra note 180.  
182. Yoo, supra note 8, at 198. 
183. See id. at 212 (observing that Britain was engaged in war from “1665-67 (Second 
Anglo-Dutch War), 1672-74 (Third Anglo-Dutch War), 1689-97 (War of the Grand Alliance), 
1702-13 (War of the Spanish Succession), 1718-20 (War of the Quadruple Alliance), 1739-48 
(War of the Austrian Succession), 1754-63 (Seven Years’ War), 1775-83 (the American 
Revolution), and 1793-1801 (War with revolutionary France)”). 
184. See id. at 198. 
185. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230-70. See also Albert W. 
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1996) (discussing the impact 
of Blackstone’s tremendous recapitulation of British common law that, at the time, was arguably 
unparalleled in its clarity, breadth, and structure). 
186. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262. Blackstone’s spelling and 
grammar has been modernized for the purposes of this Note. 
187. Id. at *262-63. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. at *252 (“What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, 
is the act of the whole nation; what is done without the king’s concurrence is the act only of 
private men.”). The Crown also had the sole power of treaty-making, as well as sending and 
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authority included the singular prerogative of declaring war and 
peace.190 For all matters, it was impossible for the Crown to do any 
wrong.191 The Crown remained “inferior to no man” and “accountable 
to no man.”192 The Crown’s military decisions were utterly outside the 
realm of public scrutiny.193 
Despite ascribing the Crown with absolute perfection,194 
Blackstone was not immune to notions of divided authority and 
separation of powers.195 Blackstone incorporated theories from fellow 
enlightenment thinkers John Locke196 and Montesquieu197 when 
articulating the limits of the Crown’s power and the role of Parliament 
in the British Constitution.198 For instance, only Parliament could 
authorize the levying of taxes, a necessary element of maintaining and 
outfitting military forces.199 The Crown could raise military forces but 
needed Parliament’s financial support to sustain them.200 Parliament 
could thus voice their support (or lack thereof) for hostilities by 
tailoring their level of financial support for the conflict.201 
Beyond the purse power, Parliament could promulgate any 
domestic law that did not diminish or interfere with the Crown’s 
authority.202 The Crown’s near-plenary power was “created for the 
benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their 
prejudice.”203 As such, Parliament retained the power to impeach the 
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2018] THE SPECTER OF A GENERALISSIMO 177 
Crown’s ministers for taking part in “improper or inglorious conduct” 
when engaging in war-making pursuant to the generalissimo’s royal 
prerogative.204 Thus, the eighteenth-century Crown’s war-making was 
subject to two legislative checks: Parliament’s purse power and limited 
impeachment power.205 All other military functions—raising troops, 
declaring war, regulating armies, commanding forces, concluding 
hostilities—were exclusively matters of royal prerogative.206 
B. The Edges of the Defensive Power: Comparing Two Commanders 
in Chief 
It is no coincidence that the Framers’ system of constitutional 
checks and balances created an executive whose war powers, on the 
whole, paled in comparison to the eighteenth-century British Crown’s 
dominion over the military.207 The abuses of the British Crown and 
royal army remained painfully fresh memories for many former 
colonists long after the Revolutionary War.208 Hamilton explicitly 
noted the differences between the two executives in Federalist No. 69: 
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy 
of the United States. In this respect his authority would be 
nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in 
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more 
than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval 
forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that 
of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the 
RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by 
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the 
legislature.209 
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Hamilton described the President as a second-rate king.210 
Perhaps in an intentional effort to inflate the British Crown’s war 
powers and soothe the fears of antifederalists, Hamilton ignored 
Parliament’s funding powers and limited impeachment authority as 
critical checks on the Crown’s war-making.211 However, Hamilton 
appropriately noted that a President could not formally sanction 
hostilities in the same manner as a British Crown—the President has 
no constitutional authority to declare war.212 Hamilton also recognized 
the contrast between the President’s limited control over local militias 
and the British generalissimo’s unrestrained command of all military 
forces as a core difference amongst the two executives.213 Generally 
speaking, Hamilton correctly analogized the relationship between the 
President’s more limited war powers and the British Crown’s extensive 
military authority, especially for longer, formalized conflicts. 
But what of the limited instances where a President faces “sudden 
emergencies,” “great occasions of state,” or “circumstances which may 
be vital to the existence of the Union”?214 As a matter of necessity, the 
President’s war powers swell during such tumultuous times to fend off 
foreign aggression.215 When faced with an imminent foreign attack, the 
President’s military authority briefly shares some of the eighteenth-
century British Crown’s power: Congress’ “declare war” power is 
negligible as the President determines the appropriate military 
response, the control of the legislature’s purse power stills for a fleeting 
moment, and a more limited accountability reigns for the Chief 
Executive’s actions. 
By holding that “a defensive war requires no declaration,”216 the 
Supreme Court recognized that the imminency of a sudden military 
crisis may render a formal declaration of war infeasible.217 The Framers 
understood that the President’s constitutional responsibilities as 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive would prevail in such 
circumstances and enable the limited deployment of US military forces 
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to suppress the incoming threat.218 As the singular Chief Executive and 
Commander in Chief of the United States’ military forces,219 the 
President exclusively determines the military response needed to 
suppress the imminent foreign threat.220 For a brief moment, Congress’ 
power to declare war is of little importance as the President alone 
decides how best to respond to the exigency. In this small defensive 
window, similarities with the British Crown bubble to the surface. The 
eighteenth-century British Crown alone decided the level of force 
mandated by an international conflict.221 As was often the case with the 
British Crown’s orders, this immediate decision was conclusive and 
unchallengeable.222 Although the President lacks the British Crown’s 
authority to bind the entire nation to war, both the British Crown and 
the President were the sole decision-makers when evaluating and 
committing an appropriate military response to rebuff imminent 
foreign aggression. 
Both Congress and Parliament could not exercise their funding 
powers to intervene during this narrow response window. Although 
Congress has significant latitude to sanction or proscribe any manner 
of hostilities,223 the Framers believed a President’s initial rebuff of 
foreign aggression to be outside the realm of congressional control.224 
Similarly, Parliament’s purse strings could not temper the British 
Crown’s initial decision to commit military forces into hostilities.225 
Only after the chief executives had responded to the imminent threat 
could the national legislatures employ their weighty purse powers to 
control the duration and intensity of the hostilities.226 When faced with 
an imminent foreign threat, presidential military authority briefly 
surges above the reach of Congress’ purse power and, for a moment, 
shares a plateau with the British Crown.227 
 
218. See supra notes 68-77, 87-97, 156-166 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 26-41, 89-95, 156-166 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text. See infra notes 228-232 and 
accompanying text for an analysis comparing the President’s and British Crown’s political 
accountability. 
223. See supra notes 98-106, 133-146 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 70-72, 87-93 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text. 
226. See sources supra notes 223-225. 
227. See sources supra notes 223-226. 
180 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
Congress does not stand alone as the sole federal branch affected 
by this executive authority—the judiciary also falls under the shadow 
of the Chief Executive’s defensive power. The judiciary is very likely 
barred from scrutinizing the President’s defensive power because it is 
a policy decision founded upon constitutional grants exclusively vested 
in the President and thus constitutes a nonjusticiable political 
determination.228 Absent judicial inquiry, the President faces limited 
accountability for committing military forces to repel a pressing 
foreign threat—the Chief Executive remains answerable only to the 
political character of the American people and self-morality.229 The 
President’s limited accountability was also shared by the eighteenth-
century British Crown, albeit on a much greater scale.230 Royal 
prerogative ensured that the Crown’s military decisions could not be 
directly questioned.231 Beyond the purse power, the most Parliament 
could do to voice their discontent with the Crown’s war-making was to 
impeach his ministers—absent a revolution, the Crown could never be 
held personally accountable for its actions.232 Although the President 
never reaches such perilous heights of political immunity, both chief 
executives enjoyed limited accountability when rebuffing foreign 
aggression. 
The President’s military authority never summits the peaks 
reached by the eighteenth-century British Crown. However, the 
distance between the two chief executives is certainly narrowed when 
the President’s defensive powers are triggered by national exigency. 
An impending foreign attack activates a surge of presidential authority 
to quell the immediate hostilities: the President is free to craft an 
appropriate military response absent formal congressional 
authorization or interference. The defensive power of the American 
Commander in Chief is momentarily untethered from congressional 
purse strings and only subject to limited accountability via the political 
virtues of the American people. The British Commander in Chief was 
no stranger to these privileges, as the Crown freely responded to 
hostilities and could initially commit military forces unburdened by 
Parliament’s powers. Despite several core differences—such as the 
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Crown’s supreme political immunity—the President’s defensive power 
stands closer to the eighteenth-century British Crown’s military 
authority than Hamilton, or his fellow federalists, may have felt 
comfortable admitting to a leery public.233 
V. CONCLUSION 
An original understanding of the Constitution would necessarily 
be incomplete without recognition of the President’s defensive war 
powers. The failures of the Articles of Confederation informed the 
Framers of the peril posed by a weak government unable to secure its 
borders or protect its national interests. In response, the Framers 
fashioned a Chief Executive exclusively empowered to lead the 
nation’s armed forces as Commander in Chief. This inherent 
constitutional authority was designed to serve as a national aegis and 
swiftly rebuff foreign threats. The Framers wanted a true “sword of the 
community”234: a vigorous and energetic Commander in Chief unafraid 
to repel a hostile onslaught. 
Although the awakening of the President’s inherent defensive 
authority momentarily quiets Congress’ war powers, the Framers 
ensured this hush does not last for long. Outside immediate exercises 
of the President’s defensive power, the Framers intended Congress to 
guide the “sword of the community” by either funding or frustrating 
war. Congress’ critical limitations on executive authority ensure that 
the President’s war powers could never subsume the tall shadow cast 
by the eighteenth-century British Crown. The original understanding 
of the defensive power reveals formidable authority, but, as evidenced 
by comparison with the British Crown, it is hardly a license for plenary 
military power or a royal prerogative for war-making. The “cryptic 
words”235 underlying the President’s constitutional war powers have 
been further confounded by a modern history of informal war-making 
and executive boundary-pushing. Delving into the original 
understanding of such powers cuts through the quagmire: the Framers’ 
design ensures that the President’s defensive war powers only manifest 
the specter of a generalissimo, even during the most trying of times. 
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